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TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [MNUC](#) [ETTC](#) [KSQA](#) [TSPA](#) [PINR](#) [UK](#) [PL](#) [UP](#)

SUBJECT: UKRAINE: BILATERAL NONPROLIFERATION WORKING GROUP
DRAFT AGENDA UPDATE

REF: A. STATE 109786

[B](#). YEAGER/UYEHARA 7/3/06 E-MAIL

[C](#). KIEV 2451

Classified By: Acting Pol Counselor George Kent, reasons 1.4(b,c,d)

[1](#)1. (S) We delivered USG response (ref A) July 5 to the Ukrainian government's (GOU) proposed agenda for the July 11-12 nonproliferation working group (NPWG) meetings to MFA Arms Control and Military-Technical Cooperation Counselor Serhiy Kucherenko. Kucherenko nodded understanding when we highlighted USG reservations regarding two of the three agenda items that MFA had suggested could include Polish and UK participation. Since the Polish government was considering assistance in disposal of melange rocket fuel, MFA had suggested including the two government's representatives for a general discussion of destruction/"utilization" that included SCUD, Frog 7, and Kh-22 missiles. We suggested that melange be listed as a separate topic.

[1](#)2. (S) Similarly, Kucherenko suggested Polish and UK participation would be appropriate for a general discussion of Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) activities, which included, inter alia, Warsaw's hosting of a PSI meeting recently and a Polish government proposal for a bilateral Ukraine-Poland hosted PSI exercise. He said he understood, however, that third-parties need not be involved in the discussion on the U.S.-Ukraine bilateral PSI agreement. MFA would schedule the discussions including Polish and UK participation on July 12, since Kucherenko said the Polish Embassy had informed him Polish Ambassador Tadeusz Chomicki was arriving in Kiev on July 11. We pointed out that the NATO PfP Trust Fund discussion would also need to take place on July 12. Kucherenko indicated his understanding.

[1](#)3. (S) When we previewed Department public affairs guidance on Russian government airing of the case involving diversion of Kh-55 missiles to China and Iran, Kucherenko said the GOU had asked the Russian government to explain why it had singled out Ukraine in its annual nonproliferation White Book. Kucherenko emphasized that Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) members understood that the case arose from a criminal violation by a Ukrainian company and was not a GOU violation of MTCR norms and procedures. During the 2005 MTCR plenary, the Russian delegation had not aired any concerns when the Ukrainian delegation had updated the gathering on its investigation into the Kh-55 case and had also not raised the subject during Ukraine-Russia bilateral meetings in December 2005. The Russian government had also missed another opportunity to present its concerns in April when Kucherenko met in Paris with Deputy Director Mashkov of the Russian MFA Security and Nonproliferation Office. Yet, Kucherenko observed, Russia had suddenly singled out Ukraine

as a missile technology proliferator. Given the slowdown in government operations due to personnel on leave, Kucherenko noted that he did not expect a Russian government response for "one or two months."

14. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor